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ARBITRATION’S DARK SHADOW 
Benjamin P. Edwards* 
Arbitration has expanded broadly, removing disputes involving entire indus-
tries from judicial review. The absence of judicial review plunges these disputes 
and industries into the shadow. This shadow causes the public to lose sight of vi-
tal information about industry practices and arbitrators to gradually lose sight of 
the law. Federal intervention may be necessary to restore consumer protections, 
including customer choice, to bring these disputes out of the shadows. 
INTRODUCTION 
As arbitration grew and supplanted vast amounts of litigation, it changed—
leaving both its opponents and its enthusiasts dissatisfied.1 Concerns about arbi-
tration’s fairness caused some arbitral forums to adopt procedures closely re-
sembling traditional litigation.2 While these reforms mollified some concerns, 
they also altered arbitration—reducing its benefits and increasing its cost. De-
spite the increased costs and complexity, however, arbitration continues to 
grow.3 
Today, arbitration casts a long, dark shadow that obscures information that 
would otherwise be available. It now cloaks countless conflicts. Unlike disputes 
resolved through public courts that allow the public to access information, dis-
putes resolved through arbitration deprive the public of significant infor-
mation.4 This absence of information alters behavior and undercuts reputation’s 
                                                        
*  Associate Professor, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law; 
J.D., Columbia Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, special thanks to Re-
becca L. Scharf. 
1  Deborah Hensler and Damira Khatam capture this dissatisfaction in their piece explaining 
the need to reconsider arbitration’s domestic and international scope. Deborah R. Hensler & 
Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the Scope of Arbitration Is Re-
Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. 
L.J. 387 (2018). 
2  See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Secu-
rities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1105–06 (1993) (explaining that “the self-
regulatory organizations, at the urging of the SEC, have introduced certain protections com-
parable to those routinely provided in civil litigation in the federal courts.”). 
3  See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1633 (2005) (describing arbitration’s growth). 
4  See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 52 
(2008) (explaining how arbitration often “blocks public access to information revealed in the 
arbitration, and eliminates the procedural rights that would have been available in the court 
system.”). 
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critical role in a free economy.5 Defendants face substantially lower reputation-
al risks for abusive practices when allegations may be resolved through private, 
secretive arbitration. 
Yet arbitration’s shadow stretches further and now plunges parties and 
courts into darkness as well. This short essay describes mandatory arbitration’s 
stunning growth and explores some of that growth’s implications. Part I briefly 
reviews the rise of pre-dispute arbitration agreements before describing arbitra-
tion’s broad reach today. Part II explores some implications of arbitration’s vast 
expansion and explains how its success undercuts its legitimacy by causing the 
public to lose sight of disputes and arbitrators to lose sight of the law. 
I. ARBITRATION’S EXPANSION 
In the past, arbitration served as a tool for parties to voluntarily agree about 
how to resolve future disputes without going to court.6 Parties would negotiate 
and select arbitration forums and procedures that offered a superior alternative 
to judicial resolution.7 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to 
protect these contracts from skeptical courts.8 
A. Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements 
Since that time, arbitration has mutated and migrated from the “consensual 
business-to-business” context and into the consumer realm.9 In this context, 
consumers and employees do not negotiate the arbitration procedures and often 
cannot even shop around between service providers to avoid signing arbitration 
agreements.10 Instead, consumers and employees often find that they are re-
quired to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) either as a condition 
of employment or in order to access goods and services.11 PDAAs obligate con-
sumers to resolve any claims which may arise in arbitration forums selected by 
the more powerful party.12 
                                                        
5  See Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal System Shapes Behavior 
by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1241 (2016) (“All else being equal, the 
informational value of the law represents another previously overlooked argument against 
confidential litigation.”). 
6  See Jean R. Sternlight, Hurrah for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Consumer 
Arbitration as a Poster Child for Regulation, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 346 (2016) [hereinaf-
ter Sternlight, Poster Child] (“Once upon a time, arbitration was a dispute resolution process 
that was adopted knowingly and voluntarily by two or more businesses that preferred to re-
solve disputes outside of court.”). 
7  Id. 
8  Originally passed as the United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 
(1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012)). 
9  See Sternlight, Poster Child, supra note 6, at 346–47. 
10  See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Pri-
vate in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2839–40 (2015). 
11  See Id. at 2871–72. 
12  See Sternlight, Poster Child, supra note 6, at 346–49. 
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As arbitration expanded, the Supreme Court repeatedly blessed the use of 
arbitration provisions to insulate disputes from public litigation.13 It first ex-
panded arbitration’s reach to include federal securities claims before expanding 
arbitration’s reach further to include antitrust claims.14 In 1991, the Supreme 
Court blessed the arbitration of federal employment law claims.15 
The Supreme Court’s support for arbitration provisions now even encom-
passes class-action waivers.16 These class-action waivers effectively bar any 
recovery for many negative-value claims.17 An individual claim has a negative 
value when the costs of litigating or arbitrating to recover exceed the claim’s 
value.18 Class actions solve this problem by allowing plaintiffs to aggregate 
their claims—transforming negative-value claims into a positive-value class 
action. By removing this procedural mechanism, PDAAs with class-action 
waivers effectively insulate many consumer businesses from challenge or judi-
cial review. 
B. Arbitration’s Broad Coverage 
Arbitration agreements now blanket vast swaths of law and business. In 
2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) released an empirical 
study detailing arbitration’s broad reach.19 It found that arbitration agreements 
were incredibly common in consumer financial contracts.20 As of 2015, arbitra-
tion agreements covered the majority of the market in: (i) credit card contracts 
(53 percent); (ii) prepaid cards (82.9 percent); (iii) storefront payday loans 
(98.5 percent); and (iv) mobile wireless services (99.9 percent).21 Studies find 
                                                        
13  For a detailed discussion of the evolving case law, see Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitra-
tion Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 273–74 (2015) (reviewing the Supreme Court’s arbitra-
tion jurisprudence). 
14  Id. at 271–73 (chronicling the changing jurisprudence). 
15  Id. at 273. 
16  AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (finding that arbitration 
agreements may require plaintiffs to bring any claims in arbitration—and not in a class ac-
tion). 
17  David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 
210 (2015) (“The primary purpose of arbitration provisions in this context is not to shift 
shareholder claims from judges to arbitrators, but to eliminate the claims entirely by under-
mining their economic viability.”). 
18  Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 305, 342 (2015) (ex-
plaining negative-value claims). 
19  See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REP. TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT § 1028(a) (2015). [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION. BUREAU, REP. TO 
CONGRESS]. 
20  Id. § 2.3. 
21  Id. 
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that consumers rarely understand these contracts and incorrectly believe that 
they retain the ability to go to court.22 
While not included in the CFPB’s report, arbitration agreements also cover 
nearly all brokerage industry contracts.23 These contracts require investors to 
arbitrate claims against the brokerage industry in an arbitration forum overseen 
by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, a trade association of broker-
dealer firms.24 One industry-funded study found that investors had a more nega-
tive perception of arbitration than any other participants in the arbitration pro-
cess and believed that arbitrators were biased against investor claims.25 
II. ARBITRATION’S DARK SHADOW 
Industry-wide adoption of pre-dispute arbitration agreements now plunges 
entire fields of law into shadow.26 As arbitrators resolve these disputes in the 
shadow of the law, the public loses sight of critical information and arbitrators 
gradually lose sight of the law. Consider how rarely public courts will consider 
payday lending practices on the merits. Payday lenders now impose arbitration 
in about 98.5 percent of their transactions.27 Isolated from public courts, arbitra-
tion’s shadow now envelopes nearly all payday lending disputes. 
                                                        
22  Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 63 
(2015) (“It is not an exaggeration to say that consumers have no idea what they are agreeing 
to when they enter into contracts containing arbitration clauses.”); Victor D. Quintanilla & 
Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute Binding Arbitration Clauses Are Un-
just: Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in the Time of Vanishing Trials, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2119, 2122 (2017) (“Prior studies underscore that the public fails to grasp 
what these terms in adhesion contracts mean when seeking goods, services, credit, or em-
ployment.”). 
23  See Jill Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an Investor Protection 
Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 171–72 (2016) (“Today, in fact, most disputes be-
tween customers of broker-dealer firms and the firms and their associated persons must be 
arbitrated through FINRA Dispute Resolution. . . .”). 
24  For a review of FINRA’s investor protection history, see Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark 
Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 573, 584–85 (forthcoming 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2829592 [https://perma.cc/36SZ-
9R8P]. 
25  Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of 
Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 350 
(2008). Since 2008, FINRA has instituted changes to its process to address some investor 
concerns. See Teresa J. Verges, Evolution of the Arbitration Forum as a Response to Manda-
tory Arbitration, 18 NEV. L.J. 437, 439 (2018). 
26  Cf. Deborah R. Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-Induced Claims Resolution Facili-
ties, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2005) (“[T]he bulk of civil litigation is vanishing from 
public view.”). 
27  CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, REP. TO CONGRESS, supra note 19, § 2.3. 
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A. The Public Benefits of Public Courts  
The federal courts have long recognized that public proceedings offer sig-
nificant benefits.28 Transparency creates public confidence in the judicial sys-
tem and also ensures that the system operates fairly.29 As these courts operate, 
they create public goods, including doctrinal precedent and social norms.30 In 
contrast, industry-wide arbitration replaces a court’s public benefit with secre-
cy.31 Because the public lacks meaningful oversight over arbitration, it cannot 
be assured that the process operates fairly. Importantly, arbitration also often 
removes the frequency, type, and result of disputes from the public eye, under-
cutting reputation’s ability to police market behavior. 
Also, reputation plays a critical, understudied role in market transactions.32 
Public legal disputes provide important reputational information that allows the 
public to make more informed assessments about market participants.33 When a 
company faces the threat of litigation, it must consider whether its public 
statements will later be proved false in litigation—causing it to speak more 
truthfully and alter its behavior. 
Widespread arbitration undercuts litigation’s ability to influence reputation. 
Arbitration and private dispute resolution remove a discovery and broadcast 
channel for reputational information, making it less likely that non-legal market 
forces will deter misbehavior.34 
                                                        
28  See, e.g., Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he bright light 
cast upon the judicial process by public observation diminishes possibilities for injustice, 
incompetence, perjury, and fraud.”). 
29  See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun 
Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 469 (2006) (“Access 
to civil cases facilitates public monitoring. . . .”); Benjamin P. Edwards, When Fear Rules in 
Law’s Place: Pseudonymous Litigation as a Response to Systematic Intimidation, 20 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 443 (2013) (discussing the public’s interest in open courts). 
30  Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 
(2014) (explaining that courts create public goods). 
31  See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (“People 
who want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When they call on the courts, they must accept 
the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and publicly accounta-
ble) officials.”). 
32  See Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1517, 1547 (2013) (explaining that 
“[r]eputation is a powerful internal constraint on” market behavior); Shapira, supra note 5, at 
1197 (“Scholars have largely neglected the question of how reputation matters not because 
they find reputational incentives to be unimportant, but rather because scholars find them to 
be messy.”). 
33  See Shapira, supra note 5, at 1213–21 (describing how legal disputes shape reputation and 
affect behavior). 
34  Id. at 1241 (“[O]penness could also make non-legal sanctions more accurate, such as by 
drawing attention to unnoticed misconduct or helping market players get better information 
on noticed misconduct. All else being equal, the informational value of the law represents 
another previously overlooked argument against confidential litigation.”). 
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B. Arbitrators Lose Sight of the Law 
Arbitrators and judges adjudicate disputes in different ways. Precedent-
creating judges owe a duty to the public to correctly state the law because court 
judgments are public acts by public officials.35 This means that judges will not 
simply regurgitate incorrect statements of law provided by the parties. Judges 
owe an independent duty to the public to correctly state the law.36 
In contrast, arbitrators do not owe these duties to the public. Some arbitra-
tion forums even prohibit arbitrators from conducting any independent re-
search.37 Instead, they obligate them to rely on the parties to define the cases 
and precedent that an arbitrator may consider.38 For example, the Financial In-
dustry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Arbitrator’s guide instructs that: 
Arbitrators should not make independent factual investigations of a case. When 
arbitrators are in doubt about an issue, legal or otherwise, they should request 
briefs from the parties. If cases are cited in a party’s motion or brief, and the ar-
bitrators wish to read the full court opinions, the arbitrators should ask the par-
ties to supply copies. Arbitrators generally should review only those materials 
presented by the parties.39 
Industry-wide arbitration now causes arbitration to grow increasingly law-
less over time. This process begins when the overwhelming majority of indus-
try members impose PDAAs on consumers. In the securities context, case law 
began to grow increasingly stale after the Supreme Court decided Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon and upheld the arbitration of securities dis-
putes arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.40 
Since that time, nearly all investor disputes with stockbrokers have been 
resolved within an industry-controlled arbitration forum.41 Because courts no 
longer consider these cases, parties in these disputes regularly rely on outdated 
case law. For example, one of the leading cases explaining the duties a broker 
                                                        
35  Cf. In re Mem’l Hosp. of Iowa City., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The 
precedent, a public act of a public official, is not the parties’ property. We would not ap-
prove a settlement that required us to publish (or depublish) one of our own opinions, or to 
strike a portion of its reasoning.”). 
36  Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
37  FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA OFFICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE 
60, 70 (2017), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/arbitrators-ref-guide.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/9HS4-AHUM]. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 60. 
40  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). 
41  See Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 422 (2016) (“Today, the law reporters are nearly devoid of any 
mention of these subjects, as the ‘law’ of broker-dealer duties has disappeared into the vor-
tex of FINRA arbitrations.”). 
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owes to a customer comes from the 1970s.42 The case law remains unchanged 
despite a changing business, statutory, and regulatory environment—growing 
increasingly stale and irrelevant with each passing year. 
Even though the law has frozen, reality has continued to change. Stock-
brokers play different roles today than they did in the past.43 Their primary role 
has evolved from providing order execution to serving as trusted financial ad-
visers.44 Despite the changing role and business model of brokerage firms, pub-
lic courts have had few opportunities to update doctrine to conform to this ever-
changing reality.45 
Industry-wide arbitration may also allow exploitative financial innovation 
to continue unchecked by courts.46 Consider the emergence of non-traded real 
estate investment trusts (non-traded REITs).47 Even though non-traded REITs 
raised billions in capital, few court decisions even mention the products. Be-
cause arbitration agreements govern the relationships between brokers and their 
clients, courts may never hear cases about a broker’s obligation to a client when 
recommending these products. 
If allowed to consider these disputes today, courts might craft different 
doctrine. For example, because brokers now regularly portray themselves as 
trustworthy financial advisers,48 courts might craft doctrine to hold brokers ac-
countable for breaches of that trust. Similarly, courts might police modern 
product offerings, particularly ones seemingly created to exploit retail investor 
misperceptions about reality.49 
                                                        
42  See Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 952 (E.D. 
Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty and 
Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make a Material Difference?, 14 J. BUS. 
& SEC. L. 105, 115 (2014) (explaining that Leib is “an often-cited case”). 
43  See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be 
Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 714 (2012) (explaining that “broker-dealers, which his-
torically sold securities and profited when a sale was made, have assumed a role that causes 
investors to believe that brokers provide impartial advice.”). 
44  Id. at 730 (“Although brokers did provide advice to customers before the mid-twentieth 
century, execution was the main task.”). 
45  See Gilles, supra note 41, at 421–22. 
46  See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 194 
(2017) (describing misdirected financial innovation). 
47  Id. at 188 (explaining that the products “appear cynically designed to make it possible for 
financial intermediaries to advance their own interests at the expense of their clients”). 
48  Joseph C. Peiffer & Christine Lazaro, Major Investor Losses Due to Conflicted Advice: 
Brokerage Industry Advertising Creates the Illusion of a Fiduciary Duty, Misleading Ads 
Fuel Confusion, Underscore Need for Fiduciary Standard, 22 PUB. INV. ARB. B. ASS’N B.J. 1 
(2015) (explaining that brokers now “advertise in a fashion that is designed to lull investors 
into the belief that they are being offered the services of a fiduciary.”). 
49  Brian J. Henderson & Neil D. Pearson, The Dark Side of Financial Innovation: A Case 
Study of the Pricing of a Retail Financial Product, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 227, 228 (2011) (con-
cluding that retail investors pay, on average, an 8 percent premium over fair market value for 
certain complex financial products). 
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To be sure, increased judicial involvement would not guarantee that the 
law would do more to protect investors. Courts might bless previously untested, 
controversial business practices, making it more difficult for consumers to re-
cover in arbitration or otherwise. At the least these outcomes would be pub-
lic—allowing legislative bodies to observe outcomes and craft appropriately 
responsive legislation. 
In the dark shadow of industry-wide arbitration, new questions continually 
arise and go unanswered. Arbitrators cannot “answer” these questions in any 
meaningful way because their decisions do not create precedent. As the same 
questions arise again and again, and are continually re-litigated and decided in 
different ways by different arbitration panels, arbitration outcomes grow in-
creasingly arbitrary. Arbitrators increasingly lose sight of the law because the 
available precedent bears little resemblance to current circumstances. 
Arbitration’s dark shadow arises when an overwhelming majority of cases 
involving an industry flow through arbitration. If a significant percentage of 
cases were resolved by courts, these cases could allow courts to set standards 
for the arbitration of other cases. Courts could decide issues presented by class 
actions or by a subset of individual actions. One possible solution would be to 
allow consumers to choose whether to go to arbitration or court after a dispute 
arises.50 
Some state regulators support federal legislation giving investors a choice 
about whether to proceed in court or in arbitration. The North American Securi-
ties Administrators Association (NASAA) has argued that giving investors the 
right to choose their dispute resolution forum would increase market confi-
dence and participation.51 With increased confidence in their ability to seek a 
recovery for wrongdoing, investors may grow more willing to invest. 
Federal regulators also have the power to restrict mandatory arbitration. 
Section 921 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) granted the SEC the authority to regulate the use 
of PDAAs.52 For reasons that remain unclear, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has not yet sought to use its authority to regulate arbitration 
agreements. 
                                                        
50  The Investor Choice Act of 2017 would do this for securities arbitration. Investor Choice 
Act of 2017, H.R. 585, 115th Cong. §§ 1–2 (2017). 
51  Letter from Mike Rothman, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., Minn. Comm’r 
Commerce, to The Honorable Keith Ellison, Member of Cong. (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://nasaa.cdn.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/NASAA-letter-to-Rep.-
Keith-Ellison-Re-Investor-Choice-Act-of-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L4U-NSMJ]. 
52  15 U.S.C. § 780(o) (2017) (“The Commission . . . may prohibit, or impose conditions or 
limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers . . . to arbitrate any future dis-
pute . . . if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the 
public interest and for the protection of investors.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
For alternative dispute resolution to remain fair, it must be fairly character-
ized as an alternative. When entire industries impose arbitration on consumers 
and investors through PDAAs, it removes cases from public courts and public 
processes, casting entire fields of law into shadow. 
Lifting this shadow may require federal intervention to lessen industries’ 
ability to impose arbitration on nearly all consumers. While the CFPB’s rule 
prohibiting class-action waivers offers a partial solution, much more may be 






























                                                        
53  Cf. Sternlight, Poster Child, supra note 6, at 375 (“Congress and the CFPB have taken a 
great first step in this area by recognizing the need for regulation when individual consumers 
are not in a position to protect their own interests.”). 
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